"Our EVMs are 'Different'"
The Election Commission gives the impression that checking the originality of software in EVMs is not possible as OTP-ROM or 'masked' chips are used. That is untrue. Not just the software, even the integrity of the hardware could be checked with the help of an authentication unit (or verification tool). The Expert Committee in its 2006 report had suggested that the manufacturers must undertake diagnostic checks and certify the integrity of both the hardware and the software of the EVMs. However, shockingly, the Election Commission scrapped the project to develop and introduce the "Authentication Unit".
As the project was ready for implementation, mysteriously, the Expert Committee suddenly called it off. The General Manager (GM) of BEL under whose supervision the project was being implemented was transferred out. The new GM informed SecureSpin that the project had been
shelved as per the directions of the Election Commission. Tampering of EVMs being a serious concern, why did the Election Commission shelve the project? Repeated attempts to ascertain
details in this regard did not yield any response from the Election Commission.
"Planned" Shortage of EVMs
Throwing all caution to the wind, the Election Commission of India met the shortfall in the electronic voting machines by commissioning state government owned EVMs. Days before the first phase of polling in 2009 general elections, the Election Commission had directed the chief electoral officers of states (who work directly under the superintendence of the Election Commission of India) to paste "Election Commission of India" stickers on the state government owned EVMs used in parliamentary elections until the elections were over. Accordingly, the Election Commission of India had allowed use of state-owned EVMs in 2009 general elections.
The next time around, if the Election Commission falls short of EVM requirements, don't be surprised if it allows use of EVMs owned by political parties or individual candidates!!